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PRIVILEGE FROM CANADIAN AND U.S.
PERSPECTIVES: REVERENCE
VS. SKEPTICISM
Kathryn Chalmers and Andrew Cunningham*
Stikeman Elliott, LLP
OR counsel representing U.S. businesses with global aspirations, it
is no longer enough to be an expert on state and federal law. In
assessing corporate risks and exposure, attorneys must be increas-
ingly mindful of cross-border issues. While not expected to know the law
of foreign jurisdictions in detail, they nevertheless need to recognize and
flag issues requiring the input of qualified foreign counsel. A good exam-
ple is "cross-border" attorney-client privilege, as illustrated by the 2010
Akzo Nobel decision, in which the European Court of Justice reaffirmed
the European Union's (EU) problematic policy of denying privilege to in-
house counsel with respect to antitrust investigations.' Canada may not
hold surprises of the magnitude of Akzo Nobel, but there are neverthe-
less significant aspects of the Canadian law of privilege that U.S. attor-
neys should know-particularly given the interconnectedness of the U.S.
and Canadian economies under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA).
Consider the increasingly common scenario in which the general coun-
sel of a U.S. multinational, together with external counsel, deals with a
U.S. lawsuit (a class action or multi-district litigation), only to learn that a
copycat class action has been launched in the Canadian courts. The U.S.
legal team decides to hold a conference call with company officials in
Canada-would such a conversation be shielded by attorney-client privi-
lege in Canada? Would it make a difference if Canadian in-house or ex-
ternal counsel were in on the call? What if analysts or investigators
involved in the U.S. defense are included? Such questions should ideally
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arbitration, including class actions, products liability and environmental litigation.
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1. Case C-550/07P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. and Ackros Chems. Ltd. v. Comm'n,
2010 E.C.R. 1-08301.
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be considered prior to responding to the Canadian suit, rather than in the
course of discoveries or at trial.
Cross-border privilege issues are significant for U.S. corporate attor-
neys as well. Consider the merger and acquisition (M&A) context. What
would happen if a Canadian shareholder of a Canadian subsidiary
brought a Canadian oppression action with respect to an acquisition that
was mainly centered in the United States? Suppose U.S. financial advis-
ers had gone to Canada to gather information about the subsidiary as
part of the transaction process; would their findings be privileged in the
Canadian action? Does Canada have anything comparable to the United
States' work product doctrine and, if so, how might that apply in such a
situation? Here, as in the previous example, a key question for U.S.
counsel is whether there is a possibility that information that could not be
exposed under the U.S. law of privilege could be brought in through the
back door by means of the Canadian suit-or the other way around, as in
situations initially involving only a Canadian branch operation but which
are complicated by an action in a U.S. court by a U.S. shareholder.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF LAWYER-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
This article focuses on the principles of lawyer-client privilege that ap-
ply in the United States and common-law Canada. 2 As will be shown,
there are differences between the two countries with respect to this type
of privilege. These appear largely to be derived from a fundamental dif-
ference in the attitude of courts on the issue. Canadian judges have
tended to treat attorney-client privilege rather reverently, giving it the
status of a constitutional right, while their American counterparts have
been more inclined to circumscribe it in the interests of fully-informed
judicial decision-making. This attitudinal difference has not generally led
to a wide divergence between Canadian and U.S. law, as Canadian juris-
dictions generally fall within the spectrum of views typically endorsed by
the various U.S. federal circuits. But the Canadian judicial approach
might be expected to produce more favorable treatment of borderline or
novel privilege claims, increasing the prospects of an expansion of attor-
ney-client privilege over the long term.
Having said this, it also appears (as discussed infra) that the "privilege
gap" between Canada and the United States is not as pronounced, and
arguably may even be reversed, in the special case of an attorney's work
product.
2. The discussion of Canadian law in this article is confined to Canada's common law
provinces and territories. The law of attorney-client privilege in the Province of
Quebec, a civil code jurisdiction, is not considered. The article discusses United
States law from an academic perspective only and is not intended to imply that
either author is licensed to practice in any U.S. jurisdiction.
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A. SOLICITOR-CLIENT PRIVILEGE VS. LITIGATION PRIVILEGE
Canadian and U.S. legal privilege operate under essentially the same
framework. Under Canadian law, privilege applies to communications
between a lawyer and his or her client. In the United States, this is
known as "attorney-client privilege," while in Canada it is most often
called "solicitor-client privilege."3 The basic test of solicitor-client privi-
lege in Canada-a communication between solicitor and client which en-
tails the seeking or giving of legal advice and is intended to be
confidential by the parties4-iS virtually the same as the U.S. test. The
fundamental conceptual similarity can be seen when the standard formu-
lations of their elements are compared side-by-side:
Canada United States
(i) a communication; i) a communication;
(ii) between solicitor and client; (ii) between privileged parties;
(iii) which entails the seeking or (iii) for the purpose of obtaining or
giving of legal advice; and providing legal assistance for the
client; and
(iv) is intended to be confidential by (iv) in confidence.6
the parties.5
Solicitor-client privilege is rooted in centuries of English and Canadian
precedent. As it has evolved in Canada, solicitor-client privilege has
ceased to be merely a rule of evidence. Instead it has become a substan-
tive rule of law7 and even a constitutional right.8 In the words of the
Supreme Court of Canada, while solicitor-client privilege is not absolute, 9
it "must be as close to absolute as possible to ensure public confidence
3. Solicitor-client privilege is occasionally used in Canada as a class term subsuming
the Canadian equivalents of both attorney-client privilege and the U.S. "work
product doctrine" (discussed infra). Those who favor this language have adopted
"legal advice privilege" as the name for the Canadian equivalent of attorney-client
privilege. While this nomenclature does not appear to have been widely adopted
by practitioners, it has been endorsed by some courts, see AFS and Co. Ltd. v.
Canada, 2001 FCT 422, para. 21 (Can. Fed. Ct.).
4. Solosky v. R., (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, 837 (Can.) (Laskin, C.J.).
5. Id.
6. DAVID M. GREENWALD ET AL., JENNER & BLOCK LLP, PROTECHNG
CONFIDENTIAi LeoAI INFORMATION: A HANDBOOK iOiR ANALYZING ISSUES
UNDIA TiHE AtORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND TiE WORK PRODUCT
DocnuNE 1 (2011). The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to this
invaluable publication, which can be downloaded online, as a guide to the U.S. law
of privilege.
7. See Desc6teaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860 (Can.); Blank v. Canada (Min-
ister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319, para. 24 (Can.).
8. Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 2002 SCC 61, [2002] 3 S.C.R.
209, para. 71 (Can.).
9. See Smith v. Jones, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 455, para. 51 (Can.).
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and retain relevance."10 In line with this position, a recent Ontario deci-
sion stated that solicitor-client privilege "is so important that no matter
how important or probative the information might be, the truth seeking
function of the justice system must generally yield to the importance of
maintaining the privilege."' The role of the privilege as a constitutional
principle is illustrated by a recent British Columbia decision which found
provisions of a money-laundering statute that authorized law-office
searches to be violations of the "principles of fundamental justice" en-
shrined in the Canadian constitution by virtue of the threat they consti-
tuted to solicitor-client privilege. 1 2 Another recent British Columbia case
described solicitor-client privilege as "a critical civil right," "virtually an
absolute privilege," and "a cornerstone value in our democracy." 13
By contrast, U.S. judges generally take a less reverential attitude to-
ward attorney-client privilege claims, typically balancing them rather crit-
ically against their possible negative effect on the fact-finding process.14
The absence of a strongly constitutionalized understanding of privilege in
the United States has arguably left attorney-client privilege more vulner-
able to political pressures than it would be in Canada. For example, the
privilege and the work product rules came under pressure in the United
States as a result of the political and regulatory reaction against corporate
misconduct post-Enron, a period that gave rise to the well-known January
20, 2003 memorandum of Deputy United States Attorney General Larry
D. Thompson, according to which:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a
corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure, in-
cluding, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work prod-
uct protections, both with respect to its internal investigation and
with respect to communications between specific officers, directors
and employees and counsel.15
While Canadian regulators have followed the U.S. trends established
by Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, solicitor-client privilege has not
been one of the objects of reform efforts north of the border.
10. R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, para. 35 (Can.). See also Blank,
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 319, para. 26 (the "confidential relationship between solicitor and
client is a necessary and essential condition of the effective administration of
justice").
11. L'Abb6 v. Allen-Vanguard Corp., 2011 ONSC 7575, para. 28 (CanLIl) (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.).
12. Fed'n of Law Soc'ys of B.C. v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), 2011 BCSC 1270, para. 144
(CanLll) (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.), aff'd 2013 BCCA 147, paras. 103-04 (CanLIl)
(Can. B.C.C.A.) (similar analysis of the privilege issue).
13. British Columbia (Auditor Gen.) v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.), 2013 BCSC 98,
paras. 23-25 (CanLil) (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
14. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). An exception is noted
infra note 154.
15. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen. to Heads of Dep't
Components of U.S. Att'ys on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. 7, (Jan.
20, 2003). Note that the memorandum proceeded to emphasize that waiver of
privilege was not to be considered an "absolute requirement," but would neverthe-
less be considered a factor in judging the adequacy of corporate cooperation.
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Solicitor-client privilege can be distinguished from a second type of
privilege, "litigation privilege," inasmuch as solicitor-client privilege is
what is called a "class" privilege. In essence, this means that anything
falling within the definition of solicitor-client privilege is presumed inad-
missible. Thus, an assertion of solicitor-client privilege will normally fail
in Canada only if the court is satisfied that it falls within one of the very
few recognized exceptions. 16 In contrast, litigation privilege attaches to
communications of the lawyer or client that, while not protected by solici-
tor-client privilege, are produced for the dominant purpose of litigation
(whether actual or contemplated). The applicability of this Canadian
counterpart to the U.S. "work product" rule is determined on a case-by-
case basis through a balancing of the interest in maintaining a "zone of
privacy" around the lawyer's work on a case with other competing inter-
ests.'7 Unlike solicitor-client privilege, which has been "strengthened, re-
affirmed and elevated in recent years,"' 8 litigation privilege has been
reduced in scope. As the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in Blank,
the Canadian test for the privilege has shifted from one of "substantial
purpose" to that of "dominant purpose" (in other words, litigation must
have been the dominant, rather than merely a substantial purpose for the
creation of the communication in question).' 9 As one Canadian appel-
late court has observed, litigation privilege "does not have the same stat-
ure as the solicitor-client privilege." 20 Nevertheless, where the dominant
purpose test has been satisfied, it can apply quite broadly. For example,
in British Columbia, unlike Ontario, photocopies of otherwise un-
privileged public documents are generally held to be privileged. 21
In the United States, a similar hierarchical distinction between attor-
ney-client privilege and the work product rule is reflected in the fact that
the work product rule is usually characterized as a "doctrine" rather than
as a privilege. The Canadian terms "dominant purpose" and "substantial
purpose" appear to roughly mirror (respectively) the "primary motivat-
ing factor" and "because of" tests that have been applied by U.S. courts.
Because provincial civil procedure rules are subject to the authority of
the Supreme Court of Canada, the affirmation of the "dominant pur-
pose" test in Blank means that the country's common law jurisdictions
16. For discussion of the "crime-fraud" exception, see infra p. 321.
17. Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 2006 SCC 39, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319, para. 34
(Can.). On related issues of nomenclature, see supra note 3.
18. Blank, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 319, para. 61.
19. Id. para 60. See also Gen. Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. 3d
321, para. 32 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (establishing the "dominant purpose" test in Onta-
rio, where previously the "substantive purpose" test had been favored by some
authorities).
20. Morrissey v. Morrissey (2000), 196 D.L.R. 4th 94, para. 20 (Can. Nfld. C.A.) (Cam-
eron, J.A.).
21. Hodgkinson v. Simms (1988), 33 B.C.L.R. 2d 129, 142-43 (Can. B.C.C.A.); Teck
Cominco Metals Ltd. v. Foster Wheeler Pyropower, Inc., 2010 BCCA 51, para. 19
(CanLll) (Can. B.C.C.A.); Cahoon v. Brideaux, 2010 BCCA 228, para. 35 (Can-
LlI) (Can. B.C.C.A.). The contrary Ontario view is expressed in General Accident,
45 O.R. 3d 321, paras. 38-41.
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now sit squarely in the "primary motivating factor" camp (to adopt the
U.S. term). This contrasts with the United States, where most courts ap-
pear to favor the "because of" test.22
U.S. counsel should accordingly be aware that Canadian courts may be
less likely to extend privilege over documents that were not prepared pri-
marily for the purpose of litigation (much like in the U.S. Fifth Circuit).2 3
But the Canadian rule may not be as strict as that enunciated by the First
Circuit in United States v. Textron, Inc., where the court upheld an Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) request for a company's tax accrual work pa-
pers on the basis that "the work product privilege is aimed at protecting
work done for litigation, not in preparing financial statements." 24 Tex-
tron has proven highly controversial because the majority essentially in-
terpreted the words "for the purpose of litigation" so as to exclude all
materials prepared in the ordinary course of business and "generic corpo-
rate documentation." 2 5 The ruling was by a margin of 3-2, with a strong
dissent preferring the Second Circuit is ruling in United States v. Ad/man,
where, inter alia, it was noted that "in anticipation of litigation" does not
mean the same thing as "prepared . . . for trial." 26 As discussed infra,
Textron has been widely criticized, including by the D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Deloitte LLP.27
Note that, in contrast to Rule 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the U.S. Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, there is no general rule in Canada that litigation privi-
lege is defeated by a demonstration by the other side that it has a "sub-
stantial need" for the materials to prepare its case and could not obtain
the materials or their equivalent by any other means without undue
hardship.28
II. PRIVILEGE AND THIRD-PARTY COMMUNICATIONS
As the business world becomes increasingly complex, lawyers resort
with ever greater frequency to external assistance in dealing with the
needs of their clients. For example, a client carrying on business interna-
tionally may have documents that require translation, or an engineer
might be needed to translate the meaning of a corporation's technical
records into terms that are understandable to the lawyer. In the leading
22. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (codifying the work product doctrine as it
applies in U.S. district courts).
23. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981) ("We
conclude that litigation need not necessarily been imminent, as some courts have
suggested, as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the
document was to aid in possible future litigation.") (internal citations omitted).
24. United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009).
25. Adam M. Braun, Open Reserve-ations?: United States v. Textron Inc. and Its Ap-
plication to International Tax Accounting, 86 NOTRE DAME L. RLv. 823, 829-30
(2011).
26. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1998).
27. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010). See also infra p.
317.
28. A. W. BRYANT, S. N. LEDERMAN & M. K. FuERsr, TiH LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
CANADA 977 (3d ed. 2009).
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Canadian case, Susan Hosiery Ltd. v. Canada, the Exchequer Court (a
predecessor of today's Federal Court) held that where an accountant is
used by the lawyer as a representative:
... for the purpose of placing a factual situation or a problem before
a lawyer to obtain legal advice or legal assistance, the fact that he is
an accountant, or that he uses his knowledge and skill as an account-
ant in carrying out such task, does not make the communications he
makes, or participates in making, as such a representative, any the
less communications from the principal, who is the client, to the law-
yer . . . .29
The debate over the limits of the Susan Hosiery principle3 o went on for
three decades before being resolved by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
General Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz.31 The court reined in expan-
sive interpretations of third-party privilege by making it clear that only if
it is "performing a service on the client's behalf which is integral to the
client-solicitor function" can a third-party communication be privileged.
On the facts in General Accident, this was held not to include communica-
tions made by an insurance claims adjuster to the attorney representing
the insurer who had hired him. As a general rule, collecting information
relevant to a case is too remote from the lawyer-client relationship to
merit protection. In support of this, the majority in General Accident re-
ferred to the U.S. Revised Uniform Evidence Rules in which "represen-
tative of the client" is defined as "one having authority to obtain
professional legal services, or to act on advice rendered pursuant thereto,
on behalf of the client." 32 While Canadian courts appear to have rejected
the "agency" analysis sometimes applied in the United States,33 there ap-
pears to be little practical difference between the doctrines, as U.S. courts
tend to restrict the privilege to those agents who are closely involved and
of great importance in facilitating the attorney-client relationship. 34
In extending solicitor-client privilege to third parties, Canadian courts
have sometimes referred to the importance of the fact that the third party
in question is a "conduit of communication" between lawyer and client.
29. Susan Hosiery Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Nat'l Revenue) [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 27
(Can.).
30. See J. Douglas Wilson, Privilege in Experts' Working Papers, 76 CAN. BAii Re'v.
346, 367 (1997).
31. See Gen. Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. 3d 321 (Can. Ont.
C.A.).
32. UNIw. R. Evm. 502(2) (cited by General Accident (1999), 45 O.R. 3d 321, para.
124).
33. Discussed immediately below in relation to General Accident (1999), 45 O.R. 3d
321.
34. See Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236, 247 (1st Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) ("[S]ecretaries, file clerks, tele-
phone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and aides of other
sorts" are said to fall within the privilege while a similar result cannot be achieved
"simply by placing accountants, scientists or investigators on their payrolls and
maintaining them in their offices . . . ."). Cf General Accident, 45 O.R. 3d 121,
discussed infra for the Canadian "functional" analysis.
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This accounts for the protection accorded to translators, for example.
But cases like General Accident show that the metaphorical "conduit"
must run directly from client to solicitor; the principle will not generally
apply to conduits that assemble, analyze, or interpret information
brought in from a source other than the client and its counsel. In Potash
Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. v. Mosaic Potash Esterhazy LP,3 5 for
example, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench held that reports
authored by technical advisors, who had assembled, analyzed, and inter-
preted information about the operations of a mining client in order to
assist counsel, did not fall under the privilege. In addition to General
Accident, the leading nineteenth-century English authority of Wheeler v.
Le Marchant also maintained that, in the words of Justice Gabrielson of
the Saskatchewan court, "informational assistance to counsel provided by
the expert is not subject to solicitor-client privilege." 3 6 The General A cci-
dent principle has been expressly accepted not only in Saskatchewan but
also in a number of other Canadian provinces, including British Colum-
bia,37 and has been endorsed as the correct approach by the leading Ca-
nadian evidence textbook.3 8
The Ontario Court of Appeal in General Accident concluded that the
insurance investigator was neither a conduit for communication nor a
"translator" (even in the extended sense that would include medical advi-
sors who "interpret" medical concepts for the lawyer). The court then
considered whether the materials prepared by the investigator could fall
within the privilege by virtue of being a product of what was essentially
the solicitor's function. This "functional approach" was, in the view of
Justice Doherty, conceptually superior to the "agency" principle that had
sometimes been referred to in Canada and, as noted above, is generally
accepted in the United States. As Justice Doherty wrote:
If the third party's retainer extends to a function which is essential to
the existence or operation of the client-solicitor relationship, then
the privilege should cover any communications which are in further-
ance of that function and which meet the criteria for client-solicitor
privilege. 39
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that while an insurance report
might be helpful to a solicitor, and even necessary to his or her work (in a
certain sense), its creation is nevertheless part of the function of the ad-
35. See Potash Corp. of Sask. Inc. v. Mosaic Potash Esterhazy LP, 2010 SKQB 460
(CanLII) (Can. Sask. Q.B.).
36. Id. para. 24 (citing Wheeler v. Le Marchant (1881), 17 Ch. D. 675 (Eng.) (in which
privilege was held not to apply to a surveyor's report to a solicitor)).
37. Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons of B.C. v. British Columbia (Info. & Privacy
Comm'r) (2002), 9 B.C.L.R. 4th 1 (Can. B.C.C.A.).
38. BRYANT E T AL., supra note 28, § 14.104.
39. Gen. Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. 3d 321 para. 120 (Can.
Ont. C.A.) (Doherty, J.A., dissenting). While Doherty J.A. dissented in part, the
majority expressly adopted his views with respect to this aspect of solicitor-client
privilege. Id. para. 51 (majority opinion).
REVERENCE VS. SKEPTICISM
juster. In other words, it is ancillary, rather than integral, to the solicitor-
client function. Thus, an insurance report is not privileged.
Subsequent case law has expanded on what is needed for a communica-
tion to be integral to the solicitor-client function. To qualify, a communi-
cation must be made in the context of correspondence of a type that
would normally, or at least frequently, be conducted between client and
solicitor. In Camp Development Corp. v. South Coast Greater Vancouver
Transportation Authority,40 which involved a citizen's lawsuit against a
municipal authority over an expropriation, communications between the
authority's lawyer and an independent project manager, who had di-
rected the property acquisitions, were held to fall under the scope of the
authority's solicitor-client privilege. The British Columbia Supreme
Court recognized that the local authority had essentially "outsourced"
central functions to the manager, including the function of communicat-
ing with the authority's counsel.41 In contrast, claims of privilege with
respect to the lawyer's communications with a property appraiser and a
geotechnical consultant were not allowed-their function being to pre-
pare reports that, while helpful, were ancillary to the solicitor-client rela-
tionship rather than integral to it.42
While the jurisprudence in this area is still developing, the privilege
rulings in Camp Development suggest that a third party is more likely to
fall within the scope of solicitor-client privilege in situations where it is
fulfilling a role that would ordinarily have been part of the client's role
but which the client has chosen to "outsource." Such choices are often
made where the client's staff lacks the time, resources, or experience to
perform the work efficiently "in house." In Camp Development, for ex-
ample, the project manager was the municipal authority's "agent" not
only in the sense of doing something on behalf of the authority, but also
in the sense of performing precisely the sort of activity that a municipal
authority would normally perform on its own behalf, if it had the time
and staff resources to do so (i.e., manage its own expropriation program).
In contrast, the insurance adjuster in General Accident and the appraiser
and geotechnical consultant in Camp Development also acted on behalf
of the municipal authority, but they performed functions that are not nor-
mally part of the business of such an authority.
Camp Development was a significant influence on Barrick Gold Corp.
v. Goldcorp Inc.,4 3 in which the General Accident principle was invoked
to bring the client's "deal team" under the solicitor-client privilege. As
Justice Campbell of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice observed, this
recognizes the "practical reality in major commercial projects where
40. Camp Dev. Corp. v. S. Coast Greater Vancouver Transp. Auth., 2011 BCSC 88
(CanLII) (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
41. Id. para. 60.
42. Id. para. 70.
43. Barrick Gold Corp. v. Goldcorp Inc., 2011 ONSC 1325 (CanLII) (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.).
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teams of individuals with focused expertise are assembled." 4 4 In other
words, the complex and time-consuming nature of many modern business
acquisitions may make it impractical for a company involved in such an
acquisition to handle it internally. Even though the required skills and
functions may, in the broadest sense, be available "in house," it is simply
more efficient to engage a skilled, outside team to assist with the process.
As a result of Barrick, such a team will likely be protected by solicitor-
client privilege (although Justice Campbell makes it clear that there is no
"automatic" deal team privilege, and that each case needs to be judged
on its facts). 4 5
If the decision is generally followed in Canada, the Barrick ruling will
offer a significant amount of comfort to lawyers and clients involved in
complex transactions. Under U.S. law, a somewhat similar privilege has
been held to apply to consultants and others whose duties make them the
"functional equivalent" of an employee.4 6 While we are not aware of a
specific deal team privilege in the United States, to the extent that both
Canadian and U.S. courts accept functional criteria as determining the
extent of lawyer-client privilege, it would seem reasonably likely that they
would take a similar position on the issue. The Delaware principle that
disclosures to investment bankers do not, in appropriate circumstances,
constitute waiver could perhaps be described as an example of a compa-
rable privilege. 4 7 While Barrick was only a brief handwritten ruling with
respect to an interlocutory motion, the judge's reasoning nevertheless
suggests (in conjunction with Camp Development) that Canadian courts
are likely to interpret General Accident in a practical way that recognizes
the role that consultants and outsourcing play in modern business. This
practical approach contrasts with the formalism for which the European
Court of Justice ruling in Akzo Nobel has been criticized. 48
A. COMMON INTEREST PRIVILEGE IN A COMMERCIAL CONTEXT
Like their U.S. counterparts, Canadian courts have consistently held
that privilege is not waived where solicitor-client communications are
shared by the client with a third party, provided that the third party and
the client themselves share a "common interest." Historically, under
both U.S. and Anglo-Canadian common law, common interest has been
found among parties that share a common position with respect to antici-
pated or actual litigation. In other words, if such parties share legal ad-
vice among themselves in furtherance of their common interest in
existing or potential litigation, that advice will not necessarily lose its
44. Id. para. 19.
45. Id.
46. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 1994).
47. See 3Com Corp. v. Diamond II Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL
2280734, at *11-12 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010) (Noble, V.C.).
48. See Case C-550/07P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. and Ackros Chems. Ltd. v.
Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 1-08301.
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privilege. 4 9 But courts in several of Canada's common law provinces
have extended the common interest privilege to include certain non-litig-
ious commercial situations. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal
noted in Maximum Ventures Inc. v. De Graaf, this shift is partly attributa-
ble to the "increased emphasis on the protection from disclosure of solici-
tor-client communications" referred to earlier.50 The unanimous court
stated:
Where legal opinions are shared by parties with mutual interests in
commercial transactions, there is a sufficient interest in common to
extend the common interest privilege to disclosure of opinions ob-
tained by one of them to the others within the group, even in circum-
stances where no litigation is in existence or contemplated.51
In Canada, the shift is also partly in recognition of the sheer complexity
of modern corporate life. One of the first cases to find a common interest
privilege in a non-litigious commercial situation, Archean Energy Ltd. v.
Canada (Minister of National Revenue), concerned the complicated re-
structuring of a corporate group. The Alberta court held that it would
have been "virtually impossible" for counsel (who was common to the
restructuring entities) to "identify privilege ownership in respect of each
of the 365 individual documents." 52 The federal Ministry of National
Revenue (comparable to the IRS) had challenged various privilege claims
on the basis that the wrong party had made them, while not denying in
most cases that the documents were privileged with respect to another
group member. The court rejected this as an overly formalistic approach
not in keeping with the Income Tax Act provision requiring the Ministry
to carry out its activities with due respect for solicitor-client privilege.53
The extension of this principle to disclosures made in commercial nego-
tiations was nevertheless far from a "given." In Pinder v. Sproule, an-
other Alberta ruling, the court expressed strong doubt that the common
interest privilege could be pressed into service in cases involving commer-
cial negotiations:
The "common interest" exception was developed for parties with a
common interest in litigation, not in business transactions. Potential
parties to a merger or other business transaction are in many ways
adverse in interest, and it strains the common interest exception to
49. See Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer et al. (No. 3), [1980] 3 All E.R. 475, 483
(C.A.) (Lord Denning described "common interest privilege" as "a privilege in aid
of anticipated litigation in which several persons have a common interest").
50. Maximum Ventures Inc. v. De Graaf, 2007 BCCA 510, para. 14 (CanLil) (Can.
B.C.C.A.).
51. Id. See also Canada (Minister of Nat'l Revenue.) v. Welton Parent Inc. (2006), 60
D.T.C. 6093, para. 107 (Fed. Ct.) (note the obiter comment of J. Gauthier, stating
"[t]his concept [i.e., the common interest privilege] applies to information that is
shared among parties to a commercial transaction and ensures that such sharing
does not result in a waiver of the privilege vis-A-vis parties outside of the group").
52. Archean Energy Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Nat'l Revenue), [1998] 1 C.T.C. 398,
para. 19 (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
53. Id.
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try and fit disclosures between such parties within that exception.54
In Pitney Bowes of Canada Ltd. v. Canada, the Federal Court consid-
ered Pinder. While agreeing that parties to a merger or other business
transaction will be adverse in interest in certain respects, and accepting
that not all privileged documents can be disclosed without loss of privi-
lege in commercial negotiations, the Federal Court nevertheless
concluded:
Still, in many commercial transactions, the parties will want to nego-
tiate on the footing of a shared understanding of each other's legal
position. They will seek legal advice from reputable solicitors whose
opinions will be respected by the other parties. Indeed, the solicitors
may represent more than one party to the deal. The sharing of legal
opinions will ensure that each party has an appreciation of the legal
position of the others and negotiations can proceed in an informed
and open way. The advice may be provided for one or more party on
the understanding that others should be provided copies. The expec-
tation, whether express or implied, will be that the opinions are in
aid of the completion of the transaction and, in that sense, are for the
benefit of all parties to it. Such circumstances, in my view, create a
presumption that the privilege attaching to the solicitor-client com-
munications remains intact notwithstanding that they have been dis-
closed to other parties.55
This principle was taken to its natural-and, for commercial lawyers,
welcome-conclusion by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Fra-
ser Milner Casgrain LLP v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue):
To my mind, the economic and social values inherent in fostering
commercial transactions merit the recognition of a privilege that is
not waived when documents prepared by professional advisers, for
the purpose of giving legal advice, are exchanged in the course of
negotiations. Those engaged in commercial transactions must be
free to exchange privileged information without fear of jeopardizing
the confidence that is critical to obtaining legal advice. 56
While the implications of this doctrine have yet to be worked out, it
appears to increase the likelihood of successfully maintaining privilege
over solicitor-client communications where these are disclosed in transac-
tional situations. An obvious and important example would be privileged
documents in a transactional data room.
The U.S. position appears broadly consistent with this (with the caveat
that courts in the United States have been less willing to extend the com-
54. Pinder v. Sproule (2003), 333 A.R. 132, para. 62 (Can. Alta. Q.B.) (finding the
communications in question privileged on other grounds, however).
55. Pitney Bowes of Canada Ltd. v. R., 2003 FCT 214, (2003), 225 D.L.R. 4th 747,
para. 20 (Fed. Ct.). This position was adopted by the Alberta Court of Queen's
Bench. Scott & Associates Eng'g Ltd. v. Ghost Pine Windfarm, LP, 2011 ABQB
339, para. 30 (CanLII) (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
56. Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP v. Canada (Minister of Nat'l Revenue), 2002 BCSC
1344, para. 14 (CanLIl) (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (Lowry, J.).
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mon interest privilege-also known as the "community of interest privi-
lege" 5 7-to interests that are purely commercial). In decisions such as
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb and Tenneco Packaging Spe-
cialty and Consumer Products, Inc. v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.58 federal
courts have found attorney-client privilege in transactional situations
where a legal opinion was shared with potential purchasers with clear
stipulations with respect to its confidentiality. In Hewlett-Packard, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California expressed a
view similar to that of the British Columbia court in Maximum Ventures:
Unless it serves some significant interest courts should not create
procedural doctrine that restricts communication between buyers
and sellers, erects barriers to business deals, and increases the risk
that prospective buyers will not have access to important information
that could play key roles in assessing the value of the business or
product they are considering buying.59
Nevertheless, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York has stated that, while litigation need not be actual or contemplated
for the common interest doctrine to apply, the common interest must still
be a legal interest and not merely a commercial or business interest.60
Thus, the privilege was held to apply in United States v. United Technolo-
gies Corp. where members of a consortium of companies shared legal ad-
vice in order to achieve the best possible tax result for each company.
While the various consortium members were not united by the prospect
of litigation, they had a common interest in minimizing their respective
taxes, which the court considered to be a legal interest.61
As is commonly the case in commercial matters, Canadian jurispru-
dence in this area is sparser and less developed, but it does appear that
there is a greater openness in Canada to accepting common-interest
claims that are founded in considerations of commercial convenience, as
Archean Energy suggests. Moreover, in addition to the U.S. considera-
tions discussed above, the Third Circuit's Teleglobe ruling adds the addi-
tional restriction that privileged information-sharing under the
57. In re Teleglobe Commc'ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 363-64 (3d Cir. 2007). This Third
Circuit ruling emphasized a distinction between community of interest (common
interest) and co-client (joint client) privileges. The former applies in cases featur-
ing multiple parties with generally aligned interests who are represented by sepa-
rate counsel while the latter applies where multiple parties (typically members of a
corporate group, as was the case with BCE and Teleglobe in Teleglobe) are repre-
sented by a single in-house legal group and/or by the same external counsel. For
an argument that the community of interest privilege should not be recognized, see
Grace M. Giesel, End the Experiment: the Attorney-Client Privilege Should not
Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARO. L. Rev. 475
(2011-12).
58. See Hewlett Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
see also Tenneco Packaging Specialty & Consumer Products, Inc. v. S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc., No. 98 C 2679, 1999 WL 754748 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1999).
59. Hewlett Packard, 115 F.R.D. at 311.
60. Fox News Network, LLC v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 739 F.Supp.2d 515, 563
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
61. See United States v. United Techs. Corp., 979 F.Supp. 108 (D. Conn. 1997).
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community of interest doctrine is limited to sharing between attorneys
rather than sharing with or among clients.6 2 It is important that Canadian
and U.S. transactional lawyers (and in-house teams involved in transac-
tions) closely study the current state of the common interest doctrine on
both sides of the border before agreeing to share their advice with ac-
quirers or sellers in the interest of completing a deal.
B. JOINT INTEREST AND SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES
Joint interest privilege is a "special case" of common interest privilege
in which the shared interest must have existed at the time the document
(or other purportedly privileged communication) was created rather than
merely at the time of disclosure.63 As an Alberta court has stated,
"neither party may assert privilege as against the other regarding commu-
nications coming into existence at the time the joint interest subsisted." 64
Under both U.S. and English law, this doctrine is the foundation for the
important proposition that in many circumstances, a business corporation
cannot assert attorney-client privilege against its own shareholders. In
the United States, this rule was stated in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, a 1970
Fifth Circuit ruling on a shareholder derivative suit:
[W]here the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges
of acting inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those in-
terests as well as those of the corporation and of the public require
that the availability of the privilege be subject to the right of the
stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the par-
ticular instance. 65
The Fifth Circuit panel looked to English law for precedent, and partic-
ularly to Gouraud v. Edison Bell Gower Telephone Co., an 1888 Chan-
cery ruling which held, in a shareholder representative action against a
company, that the company could not assert privilege against the share-
holders, the documents in question having ultimately been paid for by
their investments in the company.66 To the objection that Gouraud was
out of date and not applicable to American corporations the Court re-
sponded, as seen in the quotation above, by turning the existence of at-
torney-client privilege in such circumstances into a presumption that is
rebuttable where the shareholders can "show cause." Thus, this is often
referred to as the "good cause" exception to attorney-client privilege.
Canadian courts have taken a significantly different view. In 1988, in
McPherson v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of British Columbia, the
British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the reasoning in Gouraud
was "erroneous" in light of the subsequent (1897) decision of the House
62. In re Teleglobe, 493 F.3d at 364.
63. Commercial Union Assurance Co. PLC v. Mander, [1996] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 640
(Q.B.) (Eng.).
64. Ziegler Estate v. Green Acres (Pine Lake) Ltd., (2008) 456 A.R. 244, para. 27
(Can. Alta. Q.B.).
65. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970).
66. Id. at 1101-02.
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of Lords in Salomon v. Salomon & Co., which (as is well known) empha-
sized the legal separateness of a corporation from its members (share-
holders). In particular, Salomon made it clear that shareholders do not
have a property interest in the corporation's property, which the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held to encompass documents containing le-
gal advice.6 7 Similarly, in FCMI Financial Corp. v. Curtis International
Inc., the Ontario Superior Court of Justice referred to the Supreme Court
of Canada's assertion that "solicitor-client privilege must be as close to
absolute as possible"68 before dismissing the plaintiffs' argument that the
principle in Garner v. Wolfinbarger ought to be imported into Canada.
This is another example of the Canadian tendency to regard lawyer-client
privilege as almost sacrosanct, despite the challenge it may pose to judi-
cial fact-finding.
C. INVESTIGATIONS
How Canada's General Accident analysis applies to internally con-
ducted investigations is an important issue that has not yet been conclu-
sively resolved. In Hydro One Network Services Inc. v. Ontario (Ministry
of Labour),69 an Ontario judge held that an internally produced report
seized under a search warrant was protected by solicitor-client privilege.
The in-house counsel's affidavit that the report had been prepared for the
purpose of providing legal advice, together with words to that effect
printed on the cover page of the report, was sufficient to persuade the
court of the privilege. In contrast, another Ontario judge (at a higher
level of trial court) held in Prosperine v. Regional Municipality of Ottawa-
Carleton that the defendant municipality could not claim privilege over
an investigative report that was conducted by an outside consultant in
which information was gathered from outside sources. In that judge's
opinion, the consultant "was not acting only as a messenger or translator"
and "did more than use its expertise to assemble information provided by
[the municipality's] staff and explain it to the [municipality's] legal
department."70
It appears that the primary basis of the court's ruling in Prosperine was
that the information came from outside the company. The degree to
which it mattered that the information was collected by an external con-
67. This principle was reaffirmed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal. Discovery
Enters. v. Ebco Indus., 1998 CanLII 6453, para. 23 (Can. B.C.C.A.). See McKinlay
Transp. Ltd. v. Motor Transp. Ind'l Relations Bureau of Ontario (Inc.) (1992), 3
W.D.C.P. 2d 478, para. 7 (Can. Ont. Gen. Div.) ("The law since Salomon is that a
shareholder does not have a property interest in the underlying assets of the cor-
poration. The shareholder's only property interest is in the shares of the
corporation.").
68. FCMI Fin. Corp. v. Curtis Int'l Inc., 2003 CanLII 23179, para. 29 (Can. Ont. Sup.
Ct. J.), citing R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445 para. 35 (Can.).
69. Hydro One Network Servs. Inc. v. Ontario (Ministry of Labour), [2002] O.J. No.
4370, 118 A.C.W.S. 3d 144 (Can. Ont. C.J.) (QL).
70. Prosperine v. Ottawa-Carleton (Reg'l Mun.) (2002), 37 C.B.R. 4th 135 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.).
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sultant is less clear. In the subsequent Ontario case of Royal Bank of
Canada v. Socidt Ggndrale (Canada) et al., an internal committee had
been struck to report to the plaintiff bank's general counsel with respect
to the circumstances surrounding an account holder's alleged fraud.
While noting that the report in this case was prepared by the bank itself,
the court analogized the committee's function to a client's preparation of
a letter to its solicitor outlining the facts of its situation and requesting
legal advice, and held such a function was, under the General Accident
test, "essential to the operation of the solicitor/client relationship."7' The
court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the report mixed busi-
ness and legal issues, which in its view were "necessarily intertwined"
under the circumstances. 72
In light of General Accident and these cases, it would appear that the
most effective ways for general counsel to protect the solicitor-client priv-
ileged status of internal investigations in Canada would be to (i) ensure
that they draw on internal sources; (ii) limit the reports to legal issues,
except where business issues are necessarily intertwined with legal ones;
(iii) have them conducted "in house," where feasible, rather than by con-
sultants; and (iv) clearly mark them as "prepared for the purpose of pro-
viding legal advice." None of these steps will ensure a finding of privilege
in all types of cases, and some of them may not be required in every case,
but utilizing as many as possible should at least improve the odds that a
successful argument in favor of privilege can be made.
A noteworthy difference between Canada and the United States is that
Canadian regulators have not adopted the practice of requesting "volun-
tary" privilege waivers with respect to the internal activities and investi-
gations of corporate entities that are under investigation. In the United
States, this practice appears to be common in SEC investigations and also
in environmental investigations involving the DOJ and EPA, among
others. It does not appear to exist in any systematic form in any Cana-
dian regulatory arena, and we would expect that the Canadian view of
solicitor-client privilege as a substantive constitutional right would tend
to inhibit the development of any such practice in the future. This does
not mean, of course, that Canadian regulators would not argue vigorously
in some situations that solicitor-client privilege does not apply.
D. DISCLOSURES TO AUDITORS
As a postscript on regulatory investigations, it is worth noting the 2005
Ontario Divisional Court ruling in Philip Services Corp. (Receiver of) v.
Ontario Securities Commission, which established that where a company
provides its auditors with solicitor-client privileged documents, having
been compelled to do so by law, those documents retain their privilege in
71. Royal Bank of Canada v. Soci6t6 G6ndrale (Canada) et al., [2005] O.T.C. 902,
para. 12, 2005 CanLIl 36727, (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
72. Id. para. 6.
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the hands of the auditor.73 The ruling, which is consistent with the Cana-
dian courts' generally favorable attitude toward privilege, 74 involved an
Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) investigation into Philip Services
Corp. in the course of which Philip's auditor, Deloitte & Touche, had
provided the investigators with privileged documents that it had obtained
from Philip in the course of its audit when Philip had not given its con-
sent. The Divisional Court, which hears appeals from OSC decisions,
held that there is only a limited waiver of privilege when documents are
provided to an auditor. Among other things, the court held that the
OSC's subsequent unauthorized publication of extracts from the Philip
documents did not affect their privileged status. As a matter of principle,
"[t]he surreptitious delivery of confidential material cannot be sanc-
tioned" by permitting that material, once improperly revealed, to be used
in litigation.75
Philip Services recognizes a limited waiver of privilege in cases of dis-
closure of privileged documents for audit purposes. While counsel for
Philip focused on the conceptual awkwardness of applying a doctrine of
waiver to disclosure that is compelled by statute-in that case, Ontario's
Business Corporations Act7 6-the court did not emphasize involuntari-
ness in its ruling, focusing instead on the broader principle enunciated
above, stating:
... the message from the Supreme Court jurisprudence is clear: re-
strictions on solicitor-client privilege to attain other important socie-
tal objectives are to be closely scrutinized and restricted to what is
absolutely necessary for the competing objective so as to achieve the
minimal necessary impairment of solicitor-client privilege.77
In Minister of National Revenue v. Grant Thornton et al., the Federal
Court stated that the limited waiver doctrine extends to disclosures to
auditors that are not "strictly mandated by statute," e.g., where an audi-
tor, not having made a formal "demand," is voluntarily provided with
privileged documents in the course of its work on a fairness opinion.78 In
the words of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, "under the [limited
waiver] doctrine, the intention of the privilege holder is key."79 Note that
the situations described in Philip Services and Grant Thornton involved
73. See Philip Servs. Corp. v. Ontario Sec. Comm'n (2005), 77 O.R. 3d 209 (Can. Ont.
Div. Ct.).
74. Canada (Minister of Nat'l Revenue.) v. Welton Parent Inc. (2006), 60 D.T.C. 6093,
para. 105 (Fed. Ct.) (expressly stating this with regard to both the common interest
privilege and the doctrine in Philip Services).
75. Philip Servs. Corp., 77 O.R. 3d 209 para. 87 (internal citation omitted).
76. Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16 § 153(6) (Can. Ont.).
77. Philip Servs. Corp., 77 O.R. 3d 209 para. 51. The fact that disclosure was com-
pelled, or effectively compelled, by statute may still be significant. But see
Jourdain v. Ontario, 2008 CanLII 35684, para. 54 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
78. Canada (Minister of Nat'l Revenue) v. Grant Thornton et al., 2012 FC 1313, para.
48 (Fed. Ct.).
79. Id. para. 47.. The court in Grant Thornton went as far as to state that where the
document was created for the purpose of providing legal advice, it was irrelevant
to the consequent finding of privilege that "it does not appear to contain any legal
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the passing of privileged documents to an accountant or auditor, as op-
posed to a claim of privilege over an accountant's working papers.
A concept of "selective waiver" similar to Canada's "limited waiver"
has been accepted in the Eighth Circuit in the case of attorney-client priv-
ileged documents voluntarily provided to the SEC or other regulators for
the purposes of an investigation,80 but this has been rejected in most
other circuits.81 An example of the difference in the U.S. approach is
United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in which M.I.T.
had provided attorney-client privileged documents to a U.S. Department
of Defense auditor, apparently on the understanding that the documents
would not be further disseminated. 82 Subsequently, the IRS demanded
copies of the same documents in aid of an unrelated investigation.83 The
First Circuit panel concluded that the documents had lost their privilege
on the ground that there is a "general principle that disclosure normally
negates the privilege" that is "worth maintaining." 8 4 This view was am-
plified by the Sixth Circuit, which rejected "the concept of selective
waiver, in any of its various forms" in its 2002 ruling in In re Columbia/
HCA Healthcare Corporation Billing Practices Litigation.85
These and other U.S. cases reviewed by the authors appear to have
been primarily concerned with voluntary disclosure rather than com-
pelled disclosure, which was the issue in Philip Services.86 Having ac-
knowledged this distinction, it is worth noting that the court in Philip
Services appeared to imply that, under the law in Ontario, solicitor-client
privilege could in some cases be maintained even where the initial disclo-
sure is voluntary.87 As there is relatively little Canadian case law on this
thinking or analysis, and may even simply list facts that are otherwise discovera-
ble." Id. para. 42.
80. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977).
81. JEROME G. SNIDER ET AL., CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL INFOR-
MATION § 2.06[3] (2013); see, e.g., United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d
681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Philippines, 951 F.2d
1414, 1424-27 (3d Cir. 1991).
82. Mass. Inst. Of Tech., 129 F.3d at 683.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 685. Counsel for M.I.T. also argued that the disclosure to the Defense De-
partment came under common interest privilege on the basis that both the univer-
sity and the government had an interest in the proper performance of the defense
contracts that were the subject of the investigation. Id. at 685-86.
85. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 302
(6th Cir. 2002).
86. Note also that the court in Philip Services took a broad and practical view of the
meaning of "compelled." The court stated: "Whether the statute is formally in-
voked or not, company and auditor alike are aware of it and the company must be
deemed to have acted under it, as a form of practical compulsion." Philip Servs.
Corp. v. Ontario Sec. Comm'n (2005) 77 O.R. 3d 209 para. 44 (Can. Ont. Div. Ct.).
87. Id. para. 48, referring to British Coal Corp. v. Dennis Rye Ltd. (no. 2), [1988] 3 All
E.R. 816, para. 48 (C.A.), which concerned voluntary disclosure. The court also
stated: "Even if the statute [that compelled disclosure] did not exist, the funda-
mental importance of solicitor-client privilege would dictate the narrow waiver
rather than the broad." Philip 77 O.R. 3d 209 at para. 57.
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issue,88 it is difficult to state a definitive Canadian position. But the
court's obiter comments in Philip Services hint, at least, that Ontario
courts might be closer on this issue to the pro-privilege Eighth Circuit
than to the First or Sixth Circuits.
U.S. common law is similar to Canada's in not according privileged
status to accountant-client communications.89 While some states have
created a statutory privilege, and while Internal Revenue Code § 7525
does create a privilege in certain narrowly-defined situations,90 it appears
that in most cases no privilege applies.91 One exception, established in
the Second Circuit ruling in United States v. Kovel, applies where an ac-
countant's work consists simply in assisting client-attorney communica-
tion by "interpreting" financial concepts and information. 92 But the
court cautioned against stretching this principle too far:
Nothing in the policy of the privilege suggests that attorneys, simply
by placing accountants, scientists or investigators on their payrolls
and maintaining them in offices, should be able to invest all commu-
nications by clients to such persons with a privilege the law has not
seen fit to extend when the latter are operating under their own
steam.93
Subsequent case law has generally limited this exception to situations
analogous to interpretation. In United States v. Ackert, for example, the
Second Circuit denied privilege over records of discussions between in-
ternal counsel of Paramount Corporation and an accountant who had
once advised that company about an investment proposal that had be-
come a focus of an IRS audit.94 While the accountant had been inter-
viewed by counsel in aid of his client's case, the court held that attorney-
client privilege did not result. That privilege, it observed, "protects com-
munications between a client and an attorney, not communications that
prove important to an attorney's legal advice to a client."95
While the outcomes of such disputes are often quite similar in Canada
and the United States, the distinct attitudes of the two legal systems to-
ward privilege are nonetheless evident from the decided cases and the
deep respect of Canadian courts for lawyer-client privilege versus the
88. General Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. 3d 121, para. 45 (citing
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299-1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980))
(for the proposition that voluntary disclosure generally constitutes waiver of attor-
ney-client privilege but not of work product privilege.). Note that the majority's
discussion in General Accident was not in the context of disclosure to regulatory
authorities.
89. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
90. 26 U.S.C.A. 7525(a)(1) (West 2013).
91. See GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 35-37 (a useful account of the history of § 7525).
92. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 at 922 (1961).
93. Id. at 921.
94. See United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
95. Id. at 139. Note, however, that a more privilege-friendly rule is observed in the
Delaware state courts, particularly with respect to disclosures to investment bank-
ers in the course of corporate transactions. See 3Com Corp. v. Diamond I Hold-
ings, Inc., No. 3933-VCN, 2010 WL 2280734, at *1, *6 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2010).
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U.S. courts' entrenched skepticism. As the limited nature of the excep-
tion in Kovel might suggest, U.S. litigation over the disclosure of account-
ants' work and advice has tended to focus on the work product doctrine
rather than the attorney-client privilege. Typically, the issue arises with
respect to tax accrual work papers, the documents prepared by an inde-
pendent auditor assessing (per SEC requirements) a public company's
contingent tax liabilities with respect to the possibility of an unfavorable
reassessment of its returns by the IRS. A range of approaches has been
taken to this issue.
The U.S. work product doctrine dates from the Supreme Court's 1947
ruling in Hickman v. Taylor,96 which in turn gave rise to U.S. Federal
Rule of Procedure 26(b)(3), providing that "a party may not discover
documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial by or for another party or its representative," at least in
the absence of an adequate demonstration of "need."97 In its 1984 ruling
in Arthur Young, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a Sec-
ond Circuit decision creating a privilege for independent auditors' work
papers, analogous to the attorneys' work product doctrine. 98 This ruling
did not directly address the applicability of the Hickman work product
doctrine itself,99 however, and in subsequent cases litigants accordingly
asserted that tax accrual work papers qualified under that doctrine as
documents "prepared in anticipation of litigation."
The applicability of the U.S. work product doctrine to tax accrual work
papers hinges, therefore, on the meaning of "in anticipation of litigation."
Initially, two standards were in play, with the more popular (adopted in
nine circuits) 100 being the liberal "because of" standard. In United States
v. Adiman, a Second Circuit panel interpreted Rule 26(b)(3) to include
not only documents prepared to assist at trial but also those prepared in
anticipation of litigation even if the event triggering the litigation had not
yet occurred.o'0 But while tax accrual work papers generally passed
Adlman's "because of" test, they did not fare as well under the competing
(if less widely adopted) "primary motivating purpose" test, set out as fol-
lows by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Davis: "[l]itigation need not
necessarily be imminent . . . as long as the primary motivating purpose
behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litiga-
tion." 102 In both Davis and the subsequent ruling in United States v. El
Paso Co., the Fifth Circuit ruled that the work of preparing a tax return
96. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
97. Fno. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); See BRYANT, supra note 28.
98. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-21 (1984).
99. Id. at 817-18.
100. Christopher R. Wray, On the Road Again: The D.C. Circuit Reinvigorates the
Work Product Doctrine in United States v. Deloitte & Touche, 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1797, 1809 n.40 (2012).
101. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 at 1198-99. Note that a key consideration
was whether the documents "would have been created in essentially similar form
irrespective of the litigation." Id. at 1202.
102. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981).
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"was not primarily motivated to assist in future litigation over the re-
turn,"103 which meant that it was not protected by the work product doc-
trine. The majority in El Paso was blunt in stating that, in its view,
Congress' intent was to provide the IRS with "broad latitude" to enforce
the tax law and that requiring targets of IRS investigations to surrender
accountants' work papers was therefore justified on the grounds of IRS
convenience, as this "analysis may be useful to the IRS as a 'roadmap'
through a company's tax return."104 (While the authors know of no pre-
cisely similar case in Canada, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine this
type of reasoning in a Canadian judgment, given the constitutionalized
nature of solicitor-client privilege in Canada.)
In 2009, the First Circuit rendered its controversial Textron ruling. 05
While purporting to apply Adiman, the majority in that case actually pro-
duced what amounted to a new standard-"prepared for use in litiga-
tion"-that left even less room for work product protection than the
"primary motivating purpose" test. The decision prompted a strong re-
sponse, not least by its own dissenters, who described the majority as
"simply wrong" 0 6 and as having "recharacterize[d] the facts as suits its
purposes."107 This dissent was echoed in United States v. Deloitte LLP,08
a 2010 ruling by the D.C. Circuit which, as one scholar has noted, is espe-
cially significant because D.C. Circuit "evidence rulings govern the
United States Tax Court." 109 Pronouncing itself unconvinced by El Paso
and Textron, the Deloitte court concluded that "a document can contain
protected work-product material even though it serves multiple purposes,
so long as the protected material was prepared because of the prospect of
litigation."110 It also rejected the Government's argument that the privi-
lege had been waived because the independent auditor was potentially an
adversary in future litigation, holding that an independent auditor gener-
ally cannot be a potential "adversary" of its client in the required
sense.11'
E. SELF-EVALUATION PRIVILEGE (SELF-CRITICAL
ANALYSIS PRIVILEGE)
One key type of litigation-related privilege that has advanced more
quickly in the United States than in Canada is self-evaluation privilege or,
as it is sometimes called, self-critical analysis privilege. Since 1970, when
it was recognized in the District of Columbia in Bredice v. Doctors Hospi-
103. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982). Garwood J., dis-
senting, took particular issue with this "efficiency" argument. Id. at 546 (Gar-
wood, J. dissenting).
104. Id. at 545 (majority opinion).
105. See United States v. Textron, Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009).
106. Id. at 40.
107. Id. at 39.
108. See United States v. Deloitte LLP, 610 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
109. Wray, supra note 100, at 1810.
110. Deloitte, 610 F.3d at 138.
111. Id. at 140.
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tal, Inc. with respect to hospital medical staff reviews, 112 recognition of
this privilege has spread to a number of U.S. jurisdictions in a variety of
forms. In addition to hospital committee reports, self-evaluation privi-
lege is also widely recognized in equal employment opportunity lawsuits
(where a public interest exists in allowing employers to undertake self-
evaluations of affirmative action efforts and workplace diversity) 13 and
environmental audits (generally in a limited form).1 4 Another area in
which self-evaluation has been accepted as privileged (in some states) is
with respect to insurance company regulatory compliance reviews. At
least eight U.S. states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws in
keeping with the "Insurance Compliance Self-Evaluative Privilege Model
Act" (the U.S. Model Act) that was adopted in 1998 by the National Con-
ference of Insurance Legislators.115 It bears repeating that the self-inves-
tigative privilege generally tends to be limited in scope and that, because
it has developed primarily at the district court level, the privilege is incon-
sistently applied across the United States.116
In Canada, the development of self-evaluation privilege is even less ad-
vanced. In a 2002 ruling, an Ontario court referred to Bredice in the
course of deciding that a hospital's peer reviews and "quality assurance
reports" were privileged with respect to a medical malpractice suit." 7
While stating that the U.S. "exceptional necessity" test for approval of
production of "quality assurance" reports is not the rule in Ontario, the
court did accept the D.C. Circuit's analysis of the public interest that jus-
tifies the privilege.118 In Ontario, this privilege has continued to be rec-
ognized in subsequent medical malpractice cases, although not yet at the
appellate level.' 19 The "quality assurance" privilege protects peer review
documents as such, rather than the material facts that an investigation
reveals.120 Note that in most Canadian jurisdictions, other than Ontario,
the self-evaluation privilege has been established in the medical context
by means of statute.121
In the mid-2000s, a number of Canadian insurance industry groups be-
gan to advocate for the statutory extension of privilege to insurance com-
panies' internal self-evaluations, in order to promote frank self-analysis
112. Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970) ("There is an
overwhelming public interest in having those staff meetings held on a confidential
basis so that the flow of ideas and advice can continue unimpeded.").
113. Reid v. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., 199 F.R.D. 379, 387-88 (N.D. Ga.
2001).
114. See infra note 128 for examples.
115. A.J. Kritzman and Michael T. Griffin, Regulatory: When Internal Audit Reports are
Privileged, INSIDE COUNSEL (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/
12/21 /regulatory-when-internal-audit-reports-are-privile.
116. GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 284.
117. Steep v. Scott, (2002) 62 O.R. 3d 173, para. 43 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
118. Id. para. 43.
119. See, e.g., Redman v. Hosp. for Sick Children, 2010 ONSC 3769, para. 33 (CanLII)
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
120. Id. para 33.
121. See, e.g., Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 124 § 51 (Can. B.C.); see also Alberta
Evidence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-18 § 9 (Can. Alta.).
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with respect to risk profiles and company performance.122 Recent
amendments to Alberta's Insurance Act have begun that process, estab-
lishing a self-evaluative privilege for those subject to that legislation.123
A similar provision has been enacted under the Manitoba Insurance Act,
although at the time of writing Manitoba's provision had not come into
force.124 The Alberta and Manitoba provisions are broadly comparable
to those of states following the U.S. Model Act in stating, as a general
rule, that "an insurance compliance self-evaluative audit document is
privileged information and is not discoverable or admissible as evidence
in any civil or administrative proceeding." 2 5 As in the corresponding
provisions under U.S. state law, a number of exceptions are then set
out-e.g., with respect to fraud 26 -in addition to which there are also
"limited waiver" provisions that apply where information has been pro-
vided (voluntarily or involuntarily) to certain third parties-notably audi-
tors, the board of directors or certain government officials.127
The difference between Canada and the United States in this area is
particularly significant in environmental audits. While twenty U.S. states
have established a statutory privilege for voluntary environmental audits
under certain circumstances, Canadian provinces have not followed
suit.12 8 Moreover, Canadian courts have not, to date, proved sympathetic
to assertions of privilege with respect to such audits, although the number
of decisions in which this issue has been addressed is very small.129 An
unfortunate consequence of the paucity of litigation in this area is that a
ruling of doubtful correctness, Gregory v. Canada (Minister of National
Revenue), has stood for over twenty years as an impediment to the confi-
122. See, e.g., CANADIAN COUNCIL OF INSURANcE REGULATORS, FINAL Riirowr ON
PRIVILEGE MODLI AND Wiisn-u BLOWER PROTECFlON 2 (2008).
123. Insurance Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. 1-3, § 816.2 (Can. Alta.) [hereinafter Alta. Ins. Act].
124. The Insurance Amendment Act, S.M. 2012, c. 29, § 23 (Can. Man.) (adding a self-
evaluative privilege provision as § 87.1 of The Insurance Act, C.C.S.M., c. 140
(Can. Man.)) [hereinafter Man. Ins. Act].
125. Alta. Ins. Act § 816.2(2); Man. Ins. Act § 87.1(2) (not yet in force); cf. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3351(a) (West 2013) ("an insurance compliance self-evaluative audit
document is privileged information and is not discoverable, or admissible as evi-
dence in any legal action in any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.").
The absence of any reference to criminal proceedings in the Alberta and Manitoba
statutes is because criminal law and associated rules of evidence fall under federal
jurisdiction in Canada.
126. Alta. Ins. Act § 816.2(6)(b); Man. Ins. Act, § 87.1(6)(b) (not yet in force). Fraud is
also an exception under the Kansas statute. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3352(a)(3).
127. Alta. Ins. Act § 816.2(4); Man. Ins. Act § 87.1(4) (not yet in force). Note that the
corresponding provision of the Kansas statute differs in a number of respects that
are beyond the scope of this overview. See KAN. STAr. ANN. § 60-3351(d).
128. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 09.25.450-490 (West 2002); S.C. CoDE ANN.§§ 48-57-10 to -110 (2002); TEx. REv. Civ. STAr. ANN. § 4447cc (West 2001). For
an EPA article regarding state privilege and immunity statutes, see John A. Lee &
Bertram C. Frey, Environmental Audit Immunity Laws and Self-Disclosure Poli-
cies: A State-By-State Comparison, U.S. ENVI. PRor. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/Region5/enforcement/auditlarticleauditlaws/intro.htm (last updated 2004).
129. See R. v. McCarthy T6trault (1992), 95 D.L.R. 4th 94 (Can. Ont. Prov. Div.); see
also R. v. Polysar Rubber Corp. (1994), 17 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 307 (Can. Ont. Prov.
Div.).
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dent assertion of an environmental audit privilege.130 The court in Greg-
ory appears to have based its ruling against a finding of privilege on the
premise that the only documents that can maintain solicitor-client privi-
lege after having been prepared for a lawyer by another person are ac-
counting documents.'13 Such a distinction is not widely understood to
have been intended by the Exchequer Court in the leading case of Susan
Hosiery, discussed above, 132 and would need to be reconsidered (at a
minimum) in light of the more recent rulings in General Accident and
Camp Development.133
In Canada (Attorney General) v. Skeena Cellulose Inc., a British Co-
lumbia judge recognized that the "public interest is surely enhanced
when [a company] voluntarily undertakes a third party assessment"
and that there would be a "chilling effect" 134 if environmental audits
were routinely seized. On the other hand, there is a strong public
interest in prosecuting environmental offenses. Recognizing that
these interests need to be balanced, the judge concluded that "an
appropriate balance is met by an order requiring Skeena to disclose
portions of the risk assessment documents that relate specifically to
the subject incident described in the search warrant. The balance of
those documents should be kept confidential." 3 5
While Skeena Cellulose is interesting insofar as it gives considerable-
although by no means absolute-weight to an environmental version of
the quality assurance privilege, the ruling does not appear to have been
cited in any subsequent cases, nor do any subsequent cases appear to
have addressed the issue directly. As things currently stand in Canada,
therefore, it would be difficult to give a confident opinion that privilege
would attach to a voluntary environmental audit.13 6 Avoiding a "chilling"
effect on self-audits may require Canadian regulators themselves to de-
velop firm guidelines with respect to the circumstances under which dis-
closure will be required.137
130. Gregory v. Canada (Minister of Nat'l Rev.), [1992] 92 D.T.C. 6518 (Can. Fed.
T.D.). See FREDERICK COBURN, Toxic REAL ESTATE MANUAL, 111-15 (2011).
131. Gregory, 92 D.T.C. at 6524.
132. Susan Hosiery Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of Nat'1 Revenue) [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 27
(Can.).
133. Gen. Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz (1999), O.R. 3d 121 para. 32 (Can. Ont.
C.A.); Camp Dev. Corp. v. S. Coast Greater Vancouver Transp. Auth., 2011 BCSC
88 (CanLIl) (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.)
134. Canada (Att'y Gen.) v. Skeena Cellulose Inc., 37 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 32, para. 36
(Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.).
135. Id. para. 37.
136. Environmental audits can also raise privilege issues under the federal Access to
Information Act. R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (Can.) [hereinafter AIA]. See Hibernia
Mgmt. & Dev. Co. Ltd. v. Canada-Nfld. & Lab. Offshore Petrol. Bd., 2012 F.C. 417
(Can. Fed. Ct.) (in which the privilege was denied).
137. See COBURN, supra note 127, at 111-16.
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III. PRIVILEGE AND CLIENT MISCONDUCT
A. THE "CRIME-FRAUD" EXCEPTION
As is the case under U.S. law, Canadian law lifts solicitor-client privi-
lege in the case of communications that concern ongoing or contemplated
crimes or fraud. Because it is not part of an attorney's function to give
advice in furtherance of illegal activity, communications respecting such
activity are not protected by the privilege. 38 In the United States, this is
usually called the "crime-fraud" exception; in Canada, it is known by the
same name or, alternatively, as the "future crimes and fraud" exception.
The "fraud" element of the exception under Canadian law is typically
more applicable in a business context than its "criminal" aspect. But the
scope of this "fraud" element-whether, for example, it extends to all
tortious acts, or to breaches of regulatory requirements, or even to
breaches of contract-has not yet been resolved in Canada. In 2007, Jus-
tice Perell of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice referred to the crime-
fraud exception as the "exception for communications in furtherance of
unlawful conduct" and appears to have held that it includes not only
fraud, but all torts.139 But Justice Perell admitted that such a view "may
be contentious" in light of a 1988 ruling in which another Ontario judge
had declined to extend the exception to all torts, limiting it instead to
instances of "fraud or dishonesty," including breach of trust, trickery and
"sham contrivances."1 4 0
In Dublin, Justice Perell referred to the British Columbia case of
Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Sessions, in which the scope of the crime-fraud
exception was described in a manner that appears to be even broader
than his own interpretation. 1 41 The British Columbia court had stated:
[I]ntended crimes and frauds are but instances of the application of
the general principle that the privilege does not attach to communi-
cations in relation to intended unlawful conduct. In this context, "un-
lawful conduct" has a broader meaning than simply conduct that is
prohibited by the criminal law. It includes breaches of regulatory
statutes, breaches of contract, and torts and other breaches of
duty.142
It is important to note that this expansive view of the exception is
based on a debatable interpretation of obiter dicta of the Supreme Court
138. Goldman, Sachs& Co. v. Sessions, 1999 CanLll 5317 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (quoting
R. v. Cox and Railton (1884), 14 Q.B.D. 153, 168) ("[I]t cannot be the solicitor's
business to further any criminal object.").
139. Dublin v. Montessori Jewish Day Sch. of Toronto (2007), 281 D.L.R. 4th 368, pa-
ras. 42-47 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
140. Id. para. 37 (citing Rocking Chair Plaza (Bramalea) Ltd. v. Brampton (City)
(1988), 29 C.P.C. 2d 82 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.). Because Perell, J. concluded that the
conduct in the case met both standards, it was not necessary to resolve the issue
definitively.
141. Dublin, 281 D.L.R. 4th 368, paras. 42-47.
142. Goldman, 1999 CanLII 5317; see also Nw. Mettech Corp. v. Metcon Servs. Ltd.
(1997), 78 C.P.R. 3d 86 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.) (including breach of fiduciary duty
and breach of confidence as unlawful conduct for this purpose).
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of Canada. Specifically, the Supreme Court had quoted a passage from a
1964 note in the Harvard Law Review referring in passing to the crime-
fraud exception as having effect in the case of a "crime or tort" or with
respect to "unfounded claims or illegal projects." 143 The British Colum-
bia court held that "the adoption into the analysis by the Court, without
qualification, of [these] words" implied an endorsement of the expansive
concept of the crime-fraud exception on which they were presumably
based.144 In so doing, the court has arguably placed an unusual amount
of weight on obiter dicta. Similarly, the correctness of the expansive view
of the exception taken in Dublin could also be doubted, given that the
appellate court that granted leave to appeal in that case expressly agreed
with Justice Perell's admission that his analysis in that ruling "might be
contentious," referring to the "sanctity of solicitor-client privilege." 145
The upshot is that the scope of the crime-fraud exception in Canada is
currently "uncertain and controversial."1 4 6 There are signs of a more ex-
pansive interpretation, as we have seen, but there are also indications of
the persistence of a more conservative approach, as indicated in the leave
to appeal ruling in Dublin and even in the Supreme Court of Canada,
which, in an obiter comment (in a case not directly raising crime-fraud
issues), stated that the exception is "extremely limited" and "rare."14 7
It should be noted that, under Canadian common law, more is required
to give effect to the crime-fraud exception than the mere assertion that
the otherwise privileged documents will evidence a criminal or fraudulent
intent. 148 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Canada has approved the
ruling of the Oregon Supreme Court in State ex rel. North Pacific Lumber
Co. v. Unis, that "[g]ood-faith consultations with attorneys by clients who
are uncertain about the legal implications of a proposed course of action"
will continue to be protected by privilege even if the recommended action
is later found to have been improper.149
Like their Canadian counterparts, courts in the United States have
struggled to define the scope of the crime-fraud exception. But due in
part to the influence of Dean Wigmore, who believed that the "fraud"
143. R. v. Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565, para. 58 (Can.) (citing The Future Crime or
Tort Exception to Communications Privileges, 77 HARV. L. REv. 730, 730-31
(1964)).
144. Goldman, 1999 CanLIl 5317, para. 15.
145. Dublin, 281 D.L.R. 4th 368, paras. 2, 4 (the appeal was subsequently abandoned).
146. See5. What do I do when there is a possibility of a crime or fraud occurring?, CAN.
BAR ASS'N, https://www.cba.org/cba/activities/includes/inhouse-faq-5.aspx (last vis-
ited Sept. 3, 2013) (using these words to describe the state of this area of the law in
general).
147. Blood Tribe Dept. of Health v. Canada (Privacy Comm'r), [2008] 2 S.C.R. 574,
para. 10. Note that the ruling cites Campbell on this point, suggesting that it did
not intend its statement here as a rejection of the relatively open view taken by the
Supreme Court in that case with respect to the issue. Campbell, 1 S.C.R. 565, para.
60.
148. Dublin, 281 D.L.R. 4th 368, paras. 42-47.
149. State ex rel. N. Pac. Lumber Co. v. Unis, 579 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Or. 1978) (cited
favorably in Campbell, I S.C.R. 565, para. 60).
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element of the exception could not logically exclude intentional torts 50
expansive interpretations of the exception appear to be more firmly es-
tablished in the United States than in Canada. A recent ruling of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, for example, lists
several New York cases in which "courts have construed the exception to
reach conduct beyond the technical definitions of crimes or frauds."15
An earlier case from the same court held that the name "crime-fraud"
was "shorthand" that should not be taken literally so as to circumscribe
the exception too restrictively. 152 Moreover, it appears that some courts
have attempted to make this clear by renaming the exception the "crime/
fraud/tort exception." 53 On the other hand, there are courts (e.g., those
of Massachusetts) in which more restrictive views have apparently contin-
ued to be sustained in many cases. 154
B. UP-THE-LADDER REPORTING
As fiduciaries and by regulation, lawyers owe their clients a duty of
confidentiality. This obligation can create an ethical and professional di-
lemma when the lawyer learns that a client has acted or intends to act in a
dishonest, fraudulent or criminal manner. Lawyers in Canada are bound
by professional rules of conduct that deal specifically with the proper re-
sponse to cases of crime or fraud in a corporate context. Under the Rules
of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper Canada (the gov-
erning body for Ontario lawyers), when a lawyer who is retained by an
organization learns that the organization has acted, is acting, or intends to
act dishonestly, fraudulently, criminally, or illegally, an "up the ladder"
notice procedure is triggered.155 This procedure requires the lawyer to
advise the person who instructs him or her of the illegal conduct. Should
that person refuse to stop the conduct, the lawyer must then take his or
her concern "up the ladder" to successively more senior persons within
the organization and eventually (if those persons refuse to stop the con-
duct) to the board of directors. If the board of directors refuses to stop
the conduct, then the lawyer must withdraw. The Commentary to the
rule states that, to be reportable on an up-the-ladder basis, conduct must
be such as would lead to "substantial harm to the organization" rather
150. Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing 8 J.H. Wigmore,
Evidence § 2298 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
151. Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern, No. 07 Civ. 11586 (LAK)(GWG) 2013 WL
498724, at *2 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 11, 2013).
152. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. at n.4.
153. Olvera v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144598, at *4 (E.D. Cal.,
Dec. 15, 2011).
154. Ferrara & DiMercurio, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 173 F.R.D. 7, 13 (D. Mass.
1997) (quoting Purcell v. Dist. Att'y for the Suffolk Dist., 676 N.E.2d 439 (Mass.
1997)). It appears that Massachusetts may take a more "Canadian" approach to
attorney-client privilege generally. See in re Grand Jury Investigation, 437 Mass.
340, 351 (Mass. 2002) ("[tJhe attorney-client privilege is among the most hallowed
privileges of Anglo-American law.").
155. LAw Soc'y or, UPPER CAN., Ruiiss OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuce, R. 2.02(5.1)
(2012).
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than being "genuinely trivial." 156 A failure to satisfy reporting require-
ments under a regulation is given as an example of such non-trivial
conduct.157
Adopted in 2004, the Law Society of Upper Canada's up-the-ladder
reporting rules are the nearest Canadian counterpart to the U.S. require-
ments under § 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. By 2012, as part of
a nationwide effort to standardize legal professional conduct require-
ments, the law societies of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba,158 Nova
Scotia, 159 and Saskatchewan1 60 had adopted substantially the same rule,
although the Alberta and British Columbia provisions are triggered
under slightly different circumstances. In the case of Alberta, the "up the
ladder" reporting obligation is triggered only where fraudulent, criminal,
or illegal conduct is at issue (omitting the reference to merely "dishonest"
conduct found in the Ontario provision).161 In British Columbia, the trig-
ger is dishonest, criminal or fraudulent conduct (omitting the reference to
"illegal" conduct found in the Ontario provision).16 2
One significant difference between these responses to the corporate
scandals of the early 2000s is that, under Sarbanes-Oxley, the "reporting
up" (up-the-ladder) rules have been supplemented by "reporting out"
rules. SEC Rule 205.3(d)(2)(i), implemented under Sarbanes-Oxley, per-
mits (while not requiring) an attorney to disclose confidential client infor-
mation to the SEC, without client consent, if the attorney reasonably
believes that such disclosure is necessary "to prevent the issuer from com-
mitting a material violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the issuer or investors."163 The American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct also allow law-
yers to disclose information "related to the representation" if the "up-
the-ladder" process has failed to produce a satisfactory response. In par-
ticular, ABA Model Rule 1.13 permits such disclosure "to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization"' 64
In Canadian jurisdictions, confidentiality provisions of professional
conduct rules may continue to forbid the lawyer from disclosing the infor-
mation in those communications voluntarily outside the context of litiga-
156. Id. commentary to rules 2.02(5)-(5.2).
157. Id. Note that, while rule 2.02(5.2) ostensibly requires a lawyer to move up the
ladder when a corporate official "refuses to cause the wrongful conduct to stop,"
the commentary states that the lawyer should move up the lawyer when, having
complained to the required person, the conduct does not stop-presumably re-
gardless of whether the required person has refused or agreed to stop it. Id.
§ 2.02(5.2)(b).
158. LAw Soc'y OF MAN., CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCe, § 2.02(9) (2011).
159. N.S. BARRISTERS' Soc'Y, CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCe, § 2.02(8) (2013).
160. LAw Soc'y OF SASK., CODE OF PROF'L CONoucr, § 2.02(8) (2012).
161. LAw Soc'y oF ALTA., CODE OF CONDUce, § 2.02(11) (2012).
162. LAw Soc'y OF B.C., CoDE OF PROF'L CONDucr, § 2.02(8) (2012).
163. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2)(i) (2003).
164. MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CONoUcr § 1.13.
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tion.165 A similar tension exists in some U.S. states, as state bar
confidentiality rules that are not in line with ABA Model Rule 1.13 may
conflict with the SEC's safe harbor for attorney disclosures.166
Note that under the Canadian provisions generally, the ultimate report
can be directed to the board of directors as a whole, and not necessarily
to an independent board committee as is required under Sarbanes-Oxley.
One reason for the difference in approach could be that independent
board committees are less common in Canada.
IV. CONcLusION
It is not surprising that countries whose legal systems are generally sim-
ilarl 67 would have similar laws relating to privilege, including similar dis-
tinctions between attorney-client privilege and the zone of privacy
surrounding a lawyer's work product. But as we have seen, there are
some significant differences between American and Canadian treatments
of privilege, many of which appear to be rooted in a fundamental distinc-
tion between the American and Canadian understandings of the concept.
In Canadian jurisprudence, privilege has come to be seen as an important
element in the country's regime of constitutionally-protected rights. This
may be because the docket of the Supreme Court of Canada is weighted
toward criminal rather than commercial cases, so that doctrine around
privilege issues has tended to develop in cases where the court's sense of
itself as protector of the individual against the forces of the state has been
engaged. 168 In the United States, where the legal system has not constitu-
tionalized the concept of privilege in this way, the courts tend to take a
skeptical view of privilege claims, regarding them as limited exceptions to
the important principle that justice should be done on the basis of the
fullest possible factual record. Even the term "privilege" is used less
freely in the United States, where work product is merely a "doctrine,"
unlike its Canadian counterpart, "litigation privilege."
If we imagine U.S. and Canadian attorney-client privilege doctrines as
circles in a Venn diagram, there will of course be a large region of over-
lap. But it is the marginal cases that tend to occupy us as legal practition-
ers, and as this article has shown, the fundamental distinction between
U.S. and Canadian conceptions of attorney-client privilege may generate
different results in a number of situations that are potentially important
for businesses with cross-border operations. While Canadian common
165. See 6. When am I required to raise a matter "up the ladder"?, CAN. BAR Ass'N,
https://www.cba.org/cba/activities/includes/inhouse-faq-6.aspx (last visited Sept. 3,
2013).
166. Barry R. Temkin & Ben Moskovits, Lawyers as Whistleblowers Under the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform Act, N.Y. Sr. B.A. J., July-Aug. 2012, 11, 12.
167. With the exception of Quebec, which is not a common law jurisdiction and is not
considered in this article.
168. Solosky and McClure are among the leading Supreme Court of Canada cases on
solicitor-client privilege that involved the rights of criminal defendants or prison
inmates. See R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445 (Can.); see also
Solosky v. R., (1979), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 821, 837 (Can.).
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law courts generally tend to be more protective of this privilege, there are
certain situations-notably with respect to the work product doctrine-in
which Canadian protections may be weaker than what U.S. counsel are
accustomed to. Given the incongruities between Canadian and U.S. doc-
trine in this area, it is always prudent for counsel to make privilege issues
a priority when dealing with commercial litigation and transactions with
U.S.-Canadian cross-border components.
